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PLEASURE IN PRACTICAL REASONING*
Practical reasoning often strikes philosophers as ungrounded. It seems 
to them that desires are to be justified by reasoning that proceeds from, in­
ter alia, further desires, and these further desires are to be justified by 
reference to still further desires. Avoiding circularity and infinite regress re­
quires justification to terminate in desires that are themselves unjustified, 
and thus, from the point o f view of reasons, simply arbitrary. If techniques 
o f justification merely transmit reason-giving force from premises to con­
clusions, then if the premises are arbitrary, not different in this respect from 
whims, the conclusions will be arbitrary as well.
I’m going to argue that practical reasoning is no worse off than 
theoretical reasoning, as far as the arbitrariness of its premises goes. 
Philosophers, unless they are skeptics, are generally not worried about 
theoretical reasoning being ungrounded. One important reason why they 
are not is the role of observation in acquiring beliefs—even though it’s 
notoriously difficult to say precisely what that role is. I will argue that prac­
tical reasoning can avail itself of an analog o f belief formation underwritten 
by observational circumstances, so that practical reasoning has no more 
cause for embarrassment than theoretical reasoning.
In arguing this, I ’m going to identify an element of practical reasoning 
that accompanies the analog of observational belief formation, and I’m go­
ing to call this element “ pleasure.”  Then I will argue that this element is 
pleasure. I will provide a new argument against hedonism, and finally, I ’ll 
briefly discuss the consequences of these arguments for instrumentalist 
views of practical reasoning.
I
Here is an illustration o f the relation between observation and pleasure 
in practical reasoning, borrowed from the experience of an acquaintance:1
Michelle works for a company that provides and maintains indoor plants 
for offices. Faced with a tree that was almost completely defoliated, she decided 
to try to bring it back to life, rather than go to the expense o f replacing it. She 
pruned it back, cleaned off the dead material, watered the tree carefully, and 
applied rooting hormone. The tree, which had looked dead, revived, and “ is to­
day a beautiful tree.”
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Michelle describes bringing the tree back to life as having been “ a big 
thrill.” She says that meeting the challenge gave her real satisfaction: “ It’s really 
fun to see trees come back, go from bare branches to being covered with 
beautiful green leaves again.” She has learned that she likes challenges that in­
volve improving and reviving living things through her own perseverance, in­
telligence and skill, and that her next job will involve treating, nurturing, and 
learning about living things.
There is a good deal in this example that deserves careful attention. First, 
Michelle began her work on the dying tree for reasons that had nothing to 
do with the intrinsic rewards of caring for trees: she felt that an important 
part of her job was keeping expensive plant replacements to a minimum. 
Through her experience, Michelle came to have, first, a desire to care for 
trees, and second, a more general desire for the challenges and rewards of 
bringing living things back to a state of health. That is, in the course of the 
experience, Michelle acquired new ends; ends, moreover, for which she was 
able to adduce reasons.
Second, central to the process was Michelle’s finding the challenge of 
reviving the dying tree to be fu n . She found herself enthusiastic about what 
she was doing, engaged by it, wanting to do it. We are all familiar with the 
feeling of our work (or other things) going well, eliciting our attention and 
energy in a way that makes hard work seem almost easy. When one finds a 
task pleasant, one engages in it willingly, even eagerly; there is no need to 
force oneself to it, even when it is difficult. It is this feeling that I will call 
pleasure (begging whatever questions it is, for now, necessary to beg); and I 
will take this kind o f case as the central or paradigmatic instance of 
pleasure.
I mean to distinguish feelings from sensations, so in calling pleasure a 
feeling, I am not suggesting that it is a sensation; in fact, I am implying that 
it is not a sensation. On this way of speaking, it is a central feature of sensa­
tions that having them involves being aware of them. Feelings, however, 
may be had unawares; a familiar example is the depressed person who does 
not realize that he is depressed. Unlike sensations, the feeling of pleasure 
may sometimes be recognized only in retrospect, or when one’s attention is 
called to it by others. Feelings can involve sensations, sometimes in a way 
that makes it tempting to say that the sensations are part of the feelings; we 
often identify feelings by the sensations they involve (that sinking feeling). 
But feelings do not always involve the same sensations: a feeling of elation 
may be accompanied by a sensation of light-headedness in one case, by a 
sensation of butterflies in the stomach in another, and by no special sensa­
tion in a third; and I may be too intent on what I am doing to notice that I
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am elated. While pleasure often involves some sensation or other, there is 
no particular sensation, or class of sensations, that it necessarily involves.2
A third point to notice about the Michelle example is that something 
very like induction (or whatever pattern of reasoning it is that philosophers 
are trying to characterize when they talk about induction) is taking place 
here. Michelle learned from experience, first, that bringing a tree back to 
life is pleasurable, and second, that it is pleasurable because of the challenge 
it involves. This suggests that just as theoretical reasoning includes not only 
deductive reasoning (which does not itself respond to experience) but induc­
tive reasoning (which does), practical reasoning includes an analog of in­
duction, through which one can acquire new ends by learning from ex­
perience.
It might be objected that while there is something very much like induc­
tion going on here, that is because what is going on just is induction—that 
is, theoretical rather than practical reasoning. Michelle is out to attain 
pleasure, and learns inductively that certain things give her pleasure. Her 
decision to pursue these things is merely a matter of instrumental reasoning; 
now that she knows that tending trees is a way to  get pleasure, she decides to 
tend trees. Michelle hasn’t acquired any genuinely new ends; she has learned 
ways to address an end she already had.
We will see later just why this construal of the case is mistaken. For 
now, notice how alien this reading of the case is to the first-hand descrip­
tion. What Michelle (claims that she) wants to do is tend trees (which she has 
found to be pleasurable)—not to obtain pleasure by tending trees. This is a 
subtle but real difference, one which it is not obvious that an instrumentalist 
account can reconstruct.
Before going on to  the account of pleasure, here is an example il­
lustrating the use of its contrary, displeasure or unpleasantness, in practical 
reasoning:
Pat3 had been supporting herself as a waitress in New York while pursuing 
a dancing career. As she went from job to job, the time she remained in each 
grew shorter and shorter. Although she began each job with a good deal o f en­
thusiasm, she would soon find things to hate about the job, would fight with the 
boss, and get fired.
Over the course of this period, she found herself ever more unable to cope 
with the day-to-day details o f living. She was unable to pay her rent or run her 
errands; she wasn’t getting dates; and at one point she realized: “ I’m crying all 
the time, so I must not be doing the right thing.” She describes the time as 
dominated by “ a feeling of complete despair. I just couldn’t do it. There were 
these basic things that very stupid people could do, that I couldn’t do.”
Although she felt miserable, it took a long time until she understood what 
was making her feel that way. Eventually she realized that while some things
,
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were going very badly, “ the things that were good for me were going well and 
easily.” Finally, on the first day of a new job waiting tables, she quit. “ I 
couldn’t bring myself to do it. I didn’t even get as far as taking the first order.” 
At that point she was resolved not to waitress anymore. She now works for an 
architect and dances in the evenings.4
If the central case of pleasure is the feeling that things are going well, that 
one is performing smoothly and successfully, and that difficulties are 
manageable and can be overcome, the central case of displeasure is the con­
verse: one must force oneself to engage in the unpleasant activity, and going 
ahead with it is like pulling teeth. In extreme cases, one cannot cope, simple 
tasks become impossible, doing what one is doing becomes unbearable.
Again, one might suppose that P a t’s decision was taken on the basis of 
instrumental reasoning, the goal o f which was to avoid displeasure. But this 
would misconstrue the example. Pat herself describes her feeling of despair 
and dysfunctionality as telling her that she was doing something wrong. She 
distinguishes her choosing to  avoid waitressing (which was unpleasant and 
even painful) from a possible choice which she denies having made, that of 
choosing to  avoid displeasure and pain by not waitressing. This is a distinc­
tion that most of us can discover in our own experience. It is quite often the 
case that decisions that attend to pleasure (and its contrary, displeasure) use 
pleasure (and displeasure) as signs or symptoms, evidence as to how well 
things are going. One then often chooses the more pleasurable (or less pain­
ful) option, but this is not because pleasure is one’s goal: rather, pleasure is 
an indication o f something else. Saying what that is will require discussing 
an analogy between beliefs and desires.
II
Just as someone’s believing that p  commits him to p ’s being true, so 
someone’s desiring X  commits him to A^s being desirable. Imagine someone 
saying “ I desire X , but X  is in no way desirable” —gloomily insisting that 
obtaining X  would bring only disappointment and regret, etc. If he con­
tinues to insist that he anticipates no benefit whatsoever from satisfying the 
desire, portraying its object in unrelievedly dark tones, we will find 
ourselves hard-put to keep saying that he desires it.5 (Note that I’m not sug­
gesting that the benefit has to be the agent’s own; one may expect not to 
regret an action that benefits only others. The claim is not meant to 
preclude altruism.)
Now what does being committed to something’s being desirable come 
to in practice? There is a point that used to be made by coherence theorists,
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that one is never in a position to compare one’s beliefs with the world as it 
really is: all one is ever in a position to do is to check whether one’s beliefs 
stand in inferential relations of conflict, compatibility, support, and so on, 
with other beliefs that one has. Being committed to something’s being true 
cannot in practice be manifested in anything beyond one’s inferential com­
mitments. And a very important part of these inferential commitments 
amounts to  anticipating other beliefs. (I do not mean to suggest that believ­
ing that p  does not commit one to p  itself being the case, nor to claim that 
p ’s being the case must amount to facts about my present, future or possible 
beliefs; I am not endorsing a form of verificationism. The words ‘in prac­
tice’ are meant to carry this qualification.)
Let’s see an illustration o f this. Suppose I inform you that I believe that 
there is milk in the refrigerator. I am committed to the milk’s in fact being 
in the refrigerator: if it is not there, I am wrong. I expect that if I go and 
look, it will be there. Now what does going and looking amount to? I put 
myself in appropriate circumstances (by walking up to the refrigerator and 
opening the door): in these circumstances, I come to have a belief that there 
is a carton of milk on the top shelf. This belief is a rock-bottom belief, that 
is, it is not inferred from further beliefs. I may or may not be able to give 
further reasons for relying on this belief. But the belief is not inferred from 
these further reasons. It is clear that, on pain o f an infinite regress, there 
must be such beliefs.
We can type this belief more tightly. There are rock-bottom (i.e., non­
inferred) beliefs very different from this one: hunches or gut feelings, or the 
axioms of Euclidean geometry, understood the old-fashioned way, as self- 
evident truths. In contrast, the rock-bottom belief I acquire by looking in 
the refrigerator is experiential: I come to believe that there’s milk in the 
refrigerator by looking in the refrigerator.
A belief’s being rock-bottom carries no implication of indefeasibility: 
no matter how “ observational” my belief, I may later retract it. Also, a 
belief’s being rock-bottom carries no denial that there are necessary condi­
tions of its acquisition that must be described in terms of further beliefs. A 
good deal of background is typically required for coming to have a rock- 
bottom belief. For example, if I were unacquainted with milk cartons and 
their contents, my opening the refrigerator would not have led to my believ­
ing that there was milk in the refrigerator. Beliefs whose acquisition re­
quires such background may be, nonetheless, non-inferentially acquired, 
and be accordingly rock-bottom beliefs.6
The commitment to p ’s truth involves, in practice, the expectation that 
various beliefs, some experiential and rock-bottom, and some not, will be
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compatible with my belief that p .  To be sure, I cannot specify just which 
beliefs these are, but since I am not making a reductionist claim, this is not a 
difficulty. Now rock-bottom beliefs highlight a feature that beliefs have 
more generally. If my rock-bottom belief is impugned, I cannot fall back on 
the premises from which I inferred it, for what makes it a rock-bottom 
belief is that I acquired it non-inferentially.7 In these circumstances, I may 
find myself becoming aware of a feeling (not a sensation) of belief, which I 
will call a feeling o f  conviction. “ I just looked in the refrigerator. W hat do 
you mean, ‘How do I know?’ O f course I know.” If I stop myself in the 
middle of such a tirade, the feeling I find there is typically a feeling of con­
viction.8
The feeling o f conviction (or, as I will just say, conviction) plays an im­
portant role in one’s epistemic economy—particularly when it is of the 
rock-bottom, experiential variety. If, on considering a proposition, I find it 
unconvincing—if I lack the feeling of conviction—I may decide that I am 
on the wrong track (or that someone else is). If I do not feel conviction in 
situations in which I’m face to face with the object of my would-be belief 
(that is, when experiential rock-bottom belief is at issue), then it’s going to 
be very difficult to convince me. And if in such situations I do feel convic­
tion, my views on the subject will be difficult to dislodge. Seeing is, often 
enough, believing; experiential rock-bottom conviction is the familiar feel­
ing that goes along with believing because you’re seeing.
I now want to argue that pleasure is practical reasoning’s analog of ex­
periential rock-bottom conviction. I claimed that when one desires X, one is 
committed to A^s being desirable. But what does that commitment amount 
to in practice? Often, to the expectation that when one puts oneself in the 
appropriate situations, e.g., that when one actually gets X , one will not be 
horribly disappointed and wish that one had never heard of X. Rather, one 
expects that when one gets X , X  will turn out to be desirable. Now a 
primary indicator of whether X  is desirable or not is pleasure. Pleasure is 
the rock-bottom judgment of desirability of (an object of) present ex­
perience—one’s experiential rock-bottom judgment that, yes, this is 
desirable. Conversely, displeasure is the rock-bottom judgment of 
undesirability, directed towards present experience. That is, each is a 
response to an object of present experience that amounts to a (defeasible) 
estimate of the object’s desirability.
Pleasure is not, of course, the sole indicator. Other indicators of 
whether or not X  is desirable may be inferences regarding X s  desirability, 
or rock-bottom judgments of desirability that, like hunches, are not ex­
periential. It is therefore not the case that taking something to be desirable
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entails expecting it to be pleasurable, any more than believing something en­
tails expecting face-to-face confrontation with it to produce conviction. (I 
believe that the earth revolves around the sun, but I don’t expect it to look  
that way. I may think the policies I support to be for the best, even though I 
expect that I will only see the unfortunate side-effects I know they will 
have.) Even when one comes face to face with X , one may mistakenly think 
it is desirable, or one may be mistakenly disappointed. Like experiential 
rock-bottom conviction, pleasure is not infallible. The drug addict is a trite 
case of pleasure not properly corresponding to desirability. Perhaps another 
is the altruistic act. The fallibility of both pleasure and the evidence o f one’s 
own eyes is relied upon by magicians, pickpockets, and con artists. That 
fact does not, however, make either dispensible.
It may sound peculiar to identify a feeling with a judgment. Possibly 
this is because one feels that there must be more to a judgment than a feel­
ing; possibly because one can make judgments that do not fe e l  like much at 
all. But recall that I am not using ‘feeling’ as a synonym for sensation: 
because it is not a sensation, a feeling is not precluded from having 
cognitive content in the way one might think sensations were; and, as I 
remarked earlier, one can have feelings of which one is hardly, or not at all, 
aware. I am avoiding distinguishing feelings from judgments because the 
distinction seems too forced here to be useful. But one can just as well think 
of these feelings as aspects or accompaniments of judgments.
Finally, there is a terminological asymmetry between conviction and 
pleasure. Conviction is to be found across the spectrum of belief; we do not 
have a word that picks out conviction specifically arrived at in the course of 
experience. Pleasure, on the other hand, is restricted to experiential 
judgments of desirability. But I do not believe that the asymmetry is more 
than terminological. Just as there are non-experiential judgments, rock- 
bottom  and otherwise, that play im portant roles in theoretical reasoning 
(for example, the judgment that a particular step in a mathematical proof is 
correct), so there may be non-experiential judgments of desirability (rock- 
bottom and otherwise) that play equally important roles in practical reason­
ing.
Ill
Practical reasoning tends to take one from a position o f lesser pleasure 
to a position of greater pleasure. When I decide on Korean scallion pan­
cakes instead of another round of marinated tofu, the likely upshot is that 
my subsequent life will be more pleasant than otherwise. Some philosophers
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have noticed this tendency, and concluded that pleasure is one’s sole and 
necessary goal. In this they could not be more mistaken. Hedonists err in 
roughly the way that someone who thinks that the goal of enquiry is to max­
imize conviction might err. Normally, one’s enquiries tend to take one from 
a position of lesser conviction to  a position of greater conviction: after the 
inquiry, one has more beliefs, and believes things more strongly. How­
ever—and this is very im portant—in general one’s goal is not conviction: 
one’s goal is truth. Conviction is epistemically important as a guide to truth, 
but conviction p er se is not the object of my efforts.
To conclude that because one tends to move to  positions of greater 
conviction one’s goal is the conviction , rather than true and relevant belief 
would be seriously to misconstrue the normal case of epistemic endeavor. 
One’s feelings of conviction guide one’s changes of belief, but this does not 
make them one’s goal. Hedonists assume that because desires and goals 
change in response to experienced pleasure and displeasure, these must be 
the actual goals. But this view is naive: pleasure and displeasure are indica­
tions and signs of desirability we use in determining what our goals should 
be. Michelle did not become devoted to trees as a way of pursuing pleasure 
(if she were only interested in pleasure, she would not have genuinely cared 
about the trees); rather, her pleasurable experiences helped her decide that 
one of her (non-instrumental) ends ought to be tending trees.
Similarly, time spent with my friend is, by and large, pleasurable; and 
were this not the case, eventually we should cease being friends. 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to construe the friendship instrumen- 
tally—to conclude that I befriend him solely in order to obtain pleasure. 
The correct account of the counterfactual is, rather, this: if time spent 
together becomes, by and large, unpleasant, I shall start to wonder whether 
something is wrong with the friendship.
Notice that the argument not only cuts against egoistic hedonism, but 
against universal hedonism, or pleasure-utilitarianism, as well. If pleasure is 
a kind of estimate of desirability, the utilitarian’s Good consists in maximiz­
ing the number and force o f these estimates. This is a quite unlikely concep­
tion of the Good.
Earlier I claimed that it would be a mistake to construe the Michelle 
case as amounting to induction (i.e., theoretical reasoning about what pro­
duces pleasure) plus instrumental reasoning directed toward the goal of 
pleasure. We’re now better positioned to say just what is wrong with that 
construal.
Such inductive reasoning can o f course take place: one can learn that 
tending trees produces pleasure in much the way one can learn that one
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can’t help finding well-groomed and sincere-sounding young men with at­
tache cases convincing. But this conclusion is theoretical rather than prac­
tical; it does not underwrite subsequent action in the way that a very similar- 
looking  inference (say, from ‘A i is desirable’, ‘A 2 is desirable’, ‘A 3 is 
desirable’ . . .  to ‘All A s  are desirable’) would.
Normally, the conclusion about what tends to  produce pleasure is 
related, more or less directly, to the desirability of objects of pleasure. But 
suppose that one is instead interested simply in the pleasure produced, and 
not in any further desirability the pleasure may indicate, and that one pro­
poses to use the knowledge of what gives one pleasure to put oneself in 
situations that one will find pleasurable, without regard to the reliability of 
one’s judgments of desirability in those circumstances. That would be a lit­
tle like putting oneself in the way of lots of well-groopied and sincere- 
sounding young men with attache cases, without too much regard to what 
they are likely to persuade one of, just in order to  acquire convictions. It is 
evidence of the strategy’s motivational incoherence that knowingly putting 
oneself in the way of acquiring convictions in this manner will impede one’s 
ability actually to acquire them. Similarly, if one puts oneself in situations 
where one takes it that one’s pleasure fails to be responsive to actual 
desirability, one’s ability to make the judgments of desirability that pleasure 
consists in will be corroded.9 (The realization makes pleasures seem hollow; 
and hollow pleasures are very soon no longer pleasures at all.) This sug­
gests, first, that acting on the hedonist proposal would end up giving you 
not more pleasure, but less.10 Second, the inability of a pattern of reasoning 
to survive awareness in this way strongly suggests that there is something 
seriously wrong with it. And finally, it is in any case clear that this is not 
what is going on in the Michelle example; her reasoning is quite able to sur­
vive her own scrutiny, and that is because it is directed toward the desirabili­
ty of tending trees, rather than her own pleasure.
In developing an account of pleasure that construes it as a guide to the 
choice o f ends, rather than an end itself, we have addressed the problem of 
the ungroundedness of practical reasoning. If a form of reasoning is just the 
manipulation of arbitrary desires, the question remains: why should the 
outcome of such manipulation guide action? Attention to the role of 
pleasure in determining those desires allows us to understand them as reflec­
ting (more or less) informed estimates of desirability, and so as being not 
merely arbitrary.
Theoretical reasoning that did not attend to the world—say, solely 
deductive reasoning—would be useless; thinking that matters has to be in­
formed by the way things are. If  practical reasoning is to be useful, if it is to
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matter, it too will have to be informed by the way things are. Instrumen­
talist views of practical reasoning take it that the world has its say only by 
determining what is a means to what; but this is not enough. Attention to 
the role of pleasure shows how the world is enabled to have a further say in 
practical reasoning. Practical reasoning is informed by something that can 
be considered the practical analog of observation.
IV
The objection likely to be pressed most strongly against the foregoing is 
this: what does what I am calling ‘pleasure’ have to do with pleasure? Now 
the claim that practical reasoning is no more the manipulation of arbitrary 
desires than theoretical reasoning is the manipulation of arbitrary beliefs 
does not depend on my successfully identifying experiential rock-bottom 
judgments of desirability with pleasure. But my argument against hedonism 
does depend on this identification. So I will try to show how the observa- 
tionalist account I have presented accommodates the insights that motivate 
competing theories of pleasure, as well as the objections that have been 
traditionally urged against them. Showing how those insights are accom­
modated by my account will show it to be an account of that very thing into 
which they are insights—viz-, pleasure.
I have been developing the observationalist account of pleasure in op­
position to the instrumentalist construal, on which pleasure serves the func­
tion of an ultimate goal or end. The insight that makes the instrumentalist 
view seem plausible is nicely rendered by Anscombe.11 She remarks that
‘It’s pleasant’ is an adequate answer to ‘What’s the good of it?’ or ‘What do
you want that for?’ I.e., the chain o f ‘Why’s’ comes to an end with this answer.
This point seems to support the instrumentalist or hedonist view in the 
following way. It is taken that the chain of ‘Why’s’ is a series of requests for 
further goals. “ Why are you going shopping?”  “ To get some more moong 
dal.”  “ Why do you want more moong dal?”  “ To make cucumber soup.” 
“ Why are you going to make the soup?” (And so on.) It is presumed that 
the final answer (“ It’s pleasant” ) states the final goal, that the reason it ter­
minates explanation is that there is no further goal.
On my view, ‘It’s pleasant’ does indeed terminate explanation, but it 
does so in much the way that ‘I just believe it’ terminates explanations in the 
theoretical realm, or rather, recalling the experiential aspect, the way 
‘That’s just how it looks to me’ does. ‘It’s pleasant’ more or less amounts
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to: ‘In experiencing it, I find it desirable’. One is not adducing a further 
goal, but affirming that the goal one has just mentioned is desirable.
Anscombe continues the passage we just quoted:
a claim that ‘it’s pleasant’ can be challenged, or an explanation asked for (‘But
what is the pleasure of it?’) . . .
The instrumentalist must explain just how  the final answer (‘It’s pleasant’) 
can be challenged. And he seems to have only two choices: the challenge 
could consist in a denial that pleasure is one’s goal (not an option for the 
hedonist), or in a claim that the penultimate goal is not in fact a satisfactory 
or efficient means of attaining pleasure. This latter is an unlikely gloss on 
“ But what is the pleasure of it?” ; however, I will not press this point now. 
Perhaps the instrumentalist can find a way to handle challenges like this 
one. The observationalist account, however, is able to explain the possibili­
ty of a challenge without undue forcing. Just as “ I just believe it”  can (in 
appropriate circumstances) be challenged by “ Well, you shouldn’t ,”  so 
“ it’s pleasant” can be challenged by, “ No, it isn’t ,”  or “ Well, it shouldn’t 
be” : roughly, by claiming that it’s not, after all, desirable.
The observationalist account, then, accommodates one of the two in­
sights most partial to the instrumentalist view. (The other is the already 
discussed fact that “ You wouldn’t have chosen it if it weren’t pleasant”  is 
so often true.) But pleasure also seems plausible as a primary goal because it 
is closely connected with the good—closely enough to be identified with it, 
or confused with it. Anscombe, for example, criticizes the hedonist account 
herself, on the grounds that pleasure seems to involve a prior judgment 
about good.12 John Stuart Mill famously equates happiness with pleasure, 
pleasantness with desirability, ‘happiness’ again with ‘desirable’, and these 
with utility. Bentham calls utility “ that property in any object, whereby it 
tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this 
in the present case comes to the same thing) . . . ” . 13 Three famous 
philosophers can’t all be wrong: there must be some kind of very close tie 
between the notions of pleasure, of an object of choice, and of what is 
good.
Being able to explain this tie is thus a demand legitimately made of an 
account of pleasure. Conveniently enough, this connection lies at the heart 
o f the observationalist account. From the first-person point of view, they 
are tied together in just the way that p  and ‘I believe that p ' are. First, a 
rock-bottom judgment of desirability immediately directed towards the ex­
perienced object—that is, on the present account, pleasure—just is taking it 
to be desirable. Second, one desires only what one thinks desirable, that is,
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what one anticipates will turn out to be desirable. But expecting something 
to turn out to be desirable is, usually, expecting it to be pleasurable.
The roles o f pleasure as a terminator of explanation, and as something 
supposedly invoked by all desire, have been taken as objections to constru­
ing pleasure as a sensation: as Anscombe remarks in one of her more 
authentically Wittgensteinian moods, “ Pleasure cannot be an impression; 
for no impression could have the consequences of pleasure.” 14 Nonetheless, 
philosophers have often been tempted to understand pleasure on the model 
of sensations. One motivation may have been the instrumentalist’s need for 
a detachable (yet always available) goal. Another may have been linguistic 
reflex: we talk about something’s feeling pleasant, for example, and feelings 
are often confused with sensations. And I think there is a further point. 
Pleasure seems subject to something like first-person privilege: who to 
know better whether and how the experience is pleasant than the experienc­
ing individual himself? The experiencing individual just knows—he does 
not have to investigate, or find out, the way one must with other matters of 
fact. Traditionally, sensations were thought to be the home of this kind of 
privilege and of privacy, so it is not surprising that pleasure was assimilated 
to sensation.
On closer examination, neither first-person privilege nor privacy have 
turned out to be nearly as philosophically robust as it used to be acceptable 
to assume. Nonetheless, what remains is accommodated by my account. 
Pleasure plays a role in many ways analogous to that of certain facets of 
belief. Now belief naturally carries with it a certain first-person privilege; 
the modest one of being able, usually, to know what one believes without 
asking or otherwise investigating, and to know how strongly one feels one’s 
beliefs. (There is, of course, no claim o f infallibility being made here.) The 
analogy should make it unsurprising that pleasure exhibits similar features.
It is often objected to sensation accounts of desire that pleasure is too 
heterogenous to be plausibly taken to be a sensation. What, it is asked, do 
all the different pleasurable sensations—those experienced while skiing, 
while reading poetry, while dozing in the sun, and so on—have in common 
save the trivial property of being pleasant? As Aristotle noticed, there are 
diverse pleasures proper to particular activities and senses (EN  1175a22ff). 
This fact is a problem for a view that would identify a single sensation or 
quality as the objective of rational deliberation and action; for in what sense 
is pleasure a single objective?15 Again, rather than consider whether ad­
vocates o f sensation accounts can parry this objection, I will just note that 
the fact it adduces is accommodated comfortably by the observationalist ac­
count. What do all convictions have in common (what could they be ex­
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pected to have in common) save the property of being convictions? Beliefs 
are very different from one another because what each belief is, is mostly a 
matter of what it is about; and beliefs may be about very dissimilar things. 
If pleasure is the practical analog of conviction, we should expect pleasures 
to be very different from one another, and to share only apparent desirabili­
ty. This is why pleasures are so diverse.
Philosophers uncomfortable with sensation models of pleasure have 
often adopted adverbial accounts. These philosophers recognize that 
pleasure is normally experienced in the course of doing something, and they 
take pleasure to be something about the manner in which the activity is 
done. This view has its problems: It is hard to say just what it is that all 
pleasurable activity has in common. (Words like “ exuberance” turn up in 
what are correctly taken to be the central cases; but these are ill-suited to 
describe naps on a warm summer day.) And it is hard to explain the role of 
pleasure in justification and choice under this construal.16 Once more leav­
ing aside the question of whether adverbial views can be defended against 
these objections, note that on the view I am defending it is clear why 
pleasure taken in activity seems relatively central. Not only do we make our 
rock-bottom judgments in the course of whatever it is we are doing, but our 
deliberative attention to pleasure will be most importantly focused on our 
activities: we want to know whether what we are doing is going well, if we 
ought to be doing it, and so we pay special attention to the pleasure or 
displeasure we take in it. But there will be no adverb (save the uninfor­
mative ones, ‘pleasurably’ and, possibly, ‘enjoyably’) sure to characterize 
all pleasurable activities, for activities of the most various kinds may be 
found desirable.
It should now be far more plausible that when I say “ pleasure,” I mean 
pleasure. The apparently incompatible motivations of competing 
theoretical views of pleasure are jointly accommodated by the account 
developed here. What better indication that this is a theory whose subject 
matter is that of the other theories of pleasure—that is, pleasure? Perhaps, 
however, I should acknowledge that there is one motivation for theories of 
pleasure that I have chosen not to try to make room for. That is this thought 
that there must be some commensurable quantity to be maximized if ra­
tional choice is to be always possible. (There may be a further thought, that 
our moral life would be much simpler if there were such a commensurable 
quantity.17) I believe the conception o f practical reasoning expressed by this 
thought to be seriously mistaken, and I do not feel that I need to be con­
cessive toward it. , -V
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I will now examine three further objections. First, consider someone 
who desires a piece of chocolate cake because it will be pleasurable. On my 
account, the anticipated pleasure just is the experience of finding the cake 
desirable; so I must say he desires the cake because he wants to find it 
desirable. But this is unenlightening, peculiar-sounding, and simply misses 
the point of the appeal to pleasure.16
The way out of this problem requires not accepting too quickly the 
claim that he desires the cake because he wants the pleasure he gets when he 
eats it. Rather, what the person desires are the sensations he will get when 
eating the cake, and these will be pleasurable—that is, the kind of sensa­
tions he will find to be rock-bottom desirable. Normally one does not have 
to distinguish feelings from the sensations they involve, but here we have no 
choice. Pleasure is not a sensation, and what the man wants from the 
chocolate cake is sensations, sensations that will be desirable when he gets 
them.19
I have been arguing that pleasure permits the analog, in practical 
reasoning, of observation: that is, that reasoning that involves pleasure is a 
practical form of empirical reasoning. But it might be objected that the 
theoretical and practical versions of empirical reasoning differ fundamen­
tally, and that this is displayed in the fact that theoretical empirical reason­
ing exhibits convergence, whereas practical empirical reasoning does not. 
The difference, it will be suggested, is this. Genuine observation is intersub- 
jective, but pleasures are idiosyncratic. This raises the question whether our 
initial worry regarding the ungroundedness of practical reasoning has in 
fact been addressed.
The objection needs to be qualified before it can be answered. First, 
there is not quite as much convergence in theoretical empirical reasoning as 
the objection seems to suppose; observation is not always as intersubjective 
as all that. Science converges, but not all empirical reasoning is science. In 
Almodovar’s Women on the Verge o f  a Nervous Breakdown there is a 
character who looks like a Picasso: as though her face were one of those 
figures both of whose eyes are on the same side. I see the resemblance, and so 
do some other people I have spoken to; but not everyone, even among those 
familiar with Picasso, does. And I am not quite willing to insist that anyone 
who does not see the resemblance is wrong. Not all observation is properly 
understood on the model of identifying the colors of medium-sized dry­
goods under good light.20 Second, there is somewhat more convergence in
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judgments of desirability than the objection supposes. After all, many 
pleasures are sufficiently standardized to support large industries.
But even with the contrast between theoretical and practical empirical 
reasoning muted by these qualifications, there still seems to be a remainder 
of tolerated nonconvergence unaccounted for. We are more tolerant of 
disagreement as to what is pleasurable than of disagreement in observation: 
“ There’s no accounting for taste.” “ Chacun son g o u t”
There is, however, a simple way to accommodate this toleration. It is 
an unmysterious fact that different things are desirable for different people. 
To the extent that pleasure covaries with these differences, variation in 
pleasure may be accounted for in terms of the reliability of (the practical 
analog of) observation. True, there will be cases in which we do not want to 
say that differences in desirability account for differenced in pleasure, and 
in which we are unwilling to correct the pleasures of either party. But these 
are likely to be cases in which the disagreement does not matter very much. 
Here the toleration may be on a par with the toleration of diverging beliefs 
that we do not think matter very much.
A further difficulty lies in the transience of pleasure. As identical 
rock-bottom beliefs accumulate, conviction strengthens, but as identical 
“ observations” of desirability accumulate, pleasure—it will be ob­
jected—gives way to boredom. Pleasure cannot be, consequently, a proper 
analog of conviction.
This objection, however, rests on a simple confusion. If I look twenty 
times for the milk in the refrigerator, each time I find it confirms a constant 
fact: that the milk has been in the refrigerator throughout. In contrast, the 
twentieth cup of milk is not as desirable as the first; that I find it less 
pleasurable is a sign of the reliability o f my judgment. In this, it is no dif­
ferent from belief: were I to make repeated observations of some changing 
state of affairs (say, a state of affairs that was changing because I was mak­
ing repeated observations of it) I should find that my convictions changed 
with it. For example, I can request a record of my checking account’s activi­
ty, for a three dollar charge. If I do this repeatedly, I shall find less and less 
in my account.21
I have argued that pleasure plays an important role in practical reason­
ing, but not the role the hedonist supposes it has: pleasure is not (usually) 
the goal of instrumental reasoning; rather, it makes possible a practical 
analog o f induction to be used in deliberation of ends. In so arguing, I have 
proposed an account of pleasure: pleasure is a rock-bottom judgment of 
desirability immediately directed towards (objects of) present experience. 
As the objections just treated show, my account involves some forcing. (For
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example, we must say that what I desire of the chocolate cake is not 
pleasure, but sensations, which are pleasurable.) But I think the forcing is 
not excessive, and I think the account does better than competing accounts. 
Each o f these is developed around one insight regarding pleasure, and has 
its strength in its ability to represent that insight; but each is vulnerable to 
attack by an account developed around a competing insight. The account I 
have proposed tries to accommodate the central insights of the other com­
peting accounts of pleasure jointly. To the extent that it succeeds in this, it is 
a plausible theory of pleasure in its own right.
' ■ ' VI ■. f ■ „ ' V
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If my account of pleasure is correct, it provides reasons for thinking 
that instrumentalist views of practical reasoning, that is, views on which all 
practical reasoning consists in choosing means to given ends, are mistaken. 
First, the inductive or empirical practical reasoning in which pleasure 
figures is not a technique for determining means to given ends, but a way of 
determining the ends themselves. Our discussion of pleasure thus provides 
us with a counterexample to the instrumentalist thesis by exhibiting an alter­
native form of practical reasoning.
Second, instrumentalist views tend to transform themselves, when 
pressed, into positions that attribute to agents single and necessary goals. 
Consider a train o f reasoning which begins with my desire for a blender, 
and which ends with my deciding that I want a food processor in­
stead—even though getting a food processor is not a way of getting a 
blender. Instrumentalist construals of such cases typically posit background 
desires to which both my initial and terminal desires stand in relations of in­
strumental justification: my real desire, the instrumentalist will claim, is for 
(say) a glitzy counter appliance, and acquiring a food processor is a better 
way of satisfying that desire than acquiring a blender.
The instrumentalist wishes to posit background desires in a way that 
does not seem simply ad hoc. But the attribution of a particular desire (such 
as a desire for a new counter appliance) can be called into question in 
various ways. For example, I can continue the train o f reasoning: upon fur­
ther deliberation, I discard the desire for a food processor in favor of a new 
assortment of expensive spices. Now the posited background desire cannot 
be for a counter appliance; it will have to be for something more general, 
e.g., excitement in the kitchen.
As the instrumentalist is pressed toward more general desires, he is like­
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ly to look for a desire whose ascription cannot be dislodged in this way; and 
he is likely to look for desires to ascribe that will resist the charge of ad hoc- 
ness. Very general desires, with objects like pleasure, happiness, or desire- 
satisfaction, tend to get invoked at this point: they are a natural resting 
place. (Appeal to these desires can also address the problem of the apparent 
arbitrariness of one’s ultimate ends: even if they are not instrumentally 
justifiable, they may be supposed to be psychologically necessary, and at 
least in that sense not arbitrary.)
Attempting to save instrumentalism by construing happiness as an 
ultimate goal has the following problem: While it is plausibly said that 
everyone does desire happiness, happiness is a dummy goal, one that itself 
has no content. Happiness cannot be used as a starting point for instrumen­
tal reasoning without determining in what happiness would consist; the 
components of happiness must be identified, and arranged into a coherently 
organized goal that can be pursued.22 Attempting to use happiness to save 
the thesis that all practical reasoning is instrumental has the effect of im­
plausibly declaring the reasoning by which one arrives at one’s conception 
of happiness to be theoretical rather than practical reasoning.23
If happiness is shown to be an unpromising option for the instrumen­
talist, he is likely to turn to pleasure, which has the advantage of appearing 
to be a more substantive notion than happiness.24 But to take pleasure as 
one’s ultimate and necessary end is just to adopt some form of hedonism. In 
short, if I am right about the ways in which instrumentalist views of practical 
reasoning can be pushed towards hedonism, then the account of pleasure 
developed here, by showing that hedonism is mistaken, provides a further 
reason for thinking that instrumentalist accounts of practical reason are 
mistaken.
In dismissing the instrumentalist’s appeal to happiness, I invoked an 
occasionally discussed alternative to means-ends reasoning, the specifica­
tion o f ends; I will conclude by considering briefly the role of pleasure in ex­
ercising this alternative.25 Deliberation consists, on the specificationist ac­
count, not, or not only, in determining what would be a means to one’s 
already given ends, but in coming to understand what would constitute 
realizing a vaguely specified end, such as eudaemonia, having an entertain­
ing evening, a good constitution for the body politic, or a cure for an 
illness.26
Now while it is clear enough that we do engage in mental activity o f this 
kind, it may be less clear that this activity is subject to the normative con­
straints that would allow us to regard it as reasoning or as deliberation, prop­
erly so-called. In fact, two o f the four just-cited expositors of the specifica-
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tionist view deny that specification o f ends is a form of reasoning. Kolnai 
describes it as “ shot through with arbitrariness,” and “ an inherently decep­
tive, not to say deceitful operation . . . ” ;27 and Broadie, in a passage that 
perhaps clarifies Kolnai’s qualms about the specification of ends, presents 
an argument to the effect that such specification cannot be “ inferential” : 
because the specification of an end
is a move from the less to the more determinate, which latter, precisely because 
it is more determinate, cannot be entailed by what is less so. It might seem that 
with suitable extra premises there could be a logically acceptable inference 
from the indeterminate to the determinate end. After all, there is no acceptable 
inference from the determinate end to the means except via additional [em­
pirical] premises. . . . But . . . what additional premises would do the trick? (a) 
Factual premises, whether particular or general, would not help; nor (b) would 
any purely logical propositions. The addition (c) o f some formal propositions 
about eupraxia [the particular end whose specification Broadie is discussing], 
such as that it is ‘self-sufficient’ or ‘lacking in nothing’, would not logically 
enable one to interpret the pursuit o f eupraxia as the pursuit of S (where S is 
something more specific); whereas (d) inserting a premise that specifies eupraxia 
substantially might of course sustain the inference to a no less substantial con­
clusion, but only by thrusting back to an earlier stage the problem of how such 
propositions are obtained in the first place.28
Suppose I am faced with the problem mentioned by Williams, that of 
deciding what would make for an entertaining evening. Mummenschanz is 
at the McCarter Theater, and I have not seen them, nor, I gather, anything 
like them, before. I have factual premises, in the form of a friend’s descrip­
tion (“ they mime inanimate objects” ), and these premises do not help. 
Logical and formal propositions do not help either. What I need is a 
premise of Broadie’s type (d), one that specifies my end of being entertained 
substantially and in the relevant respects: I need to know whether Mum­
menschanz will count as entertainment, that is, whether it will be entertain­
ing.
As Broadie insists, the demand for such premises raises “ the problem 
of how such propositions are obtained in the first place.” She evidently in­
tends mention of the problem to have the force of a rhetorical question, 
since she concludes that no such premises are available. But consideration 
of a concrete situation in which the demand arises makes it obvious how 
such premises are obtained: I can go to McCarter, and discover, by observa­
tion, whether Mummenschanz is entertaining or not. That is, specification 
of ends can be understood to be a form o f rational deliberation, but one 
that, like the practical analog of induction, relies essentially on practical ex­
perience. (Testimony may of course take the place o f experience, as when I
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am told not only that the performance is mime of such-and-such a kind, but 
that it is vastly entertaining. But here I rely on experience indirectly.)
The example reminds us that actual judgments of desirability, ex­
periential or otherwise, are normally a good deal richer than those to which 
I have, for expository convenience, largely confined myself. To attend the 
performance and thereby discover that Mummenschanz is vastly entertain­
ing is of course to discover that attending the performance is in certain 
respects desirable, and it is to have taken a good deal of pleasure in the per­
formance, but my response, and what I have found out, is not exhausted by 
these descriptions. A more adequate account of practical observation would 
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and for helpful discussion; and to the participants in Harvard’s nth-year seminar for 
their objections and suggestions.
1. I’m grateful to Michelle Desaulniers for the example.
2. On this point, see Gosling, 1969, pp. 46f, and below, sec. 5. ;
3. Real name withheld on request.
4. Although traditionally ‘pain’ has been used to mean the converse of pleasure I 
will use words like ‘displeasure’ and ‘unpleasant’ instead, since, first, while pain is 
generally unpleasant, many things are unpleasant but not painful, and second, we 
need a name for the sensations we normally call ‘pain’, and since pleasure is a feeling 
rather than a sensation, its contrary should be a feeling as well. The example makes 
the traditional usage understandable; it is all too natural to describe Pat’s experience 
as painful. Because physical sensations of pain typically make it difficult or impossi­
ble to continue doing what one is doing, physical pain occupies much the same role 
as the more central cases o f unpleasantness that we are now considering. This ex­
plains why it is natural to extend the word ‘pain’ to instances such as this one.
5. For related considerations, see Anscombe, 1985, pp. 70ff. Notice that I am 
not claiming that one cannot desire something under one aspect while failing to 
judge it desirable in another respect, or even while judging it undesirable, all things 
considered.
I have found that it is still difficult for some philosophers to believe the claim 
put forward in the text. For their benefit, it is worth noting that its role here is 
heuristic: it is used to introduce my account of pleasure, but the account itself does 
not depend on it.
6. It may be argued that inference must have taken place, perhaps unconscious­
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ly. But if unconscious inference is taking place in cases like these, then we can either 
restrict the term ‘rock-bottom belief5 to cases in which not even unconscious in­
ferences occur, or we can allow it to apply where unconscious inferences are found. I 
will be using the notion o f rock-bottom belief to help the reader pick out a certain 
kind o f experience or feeling. Since distinguishing between cases in which un­
conscious inferences are being made, and those in which they aren’t, wouldn’t be 
useful for this purpose, adopting the restriction wouldn’t be helpful.
7. Or, at any rate, I am not aware of the unconscious inferences by which I ac­
quired it. I may be able to provide arguments from other (background) beliefs from 
which I could have inferred it; and sometimes I will actually fall back on these. The 
situation I am now interested in is one in which I do not fall back on further beliefs.
8. This technical use of the word ‘conviction’ is not as far a cry from its ordinary 
use as might be thought. When asked to list one’s convictions—the things about 
which one has this feeling—one normally produces, say, points o f religious or 
political or moral doctrine, rather than beliefs about what’s in the refrigerator. And 
this might suggest that conviction is rather rare. But I am claiming that conviction is 
a feeling, rather than a sensation, which is to say that one is not always aware o f it. 
One may be made aware of the feeling by a challenge; if someone exerts pressure on 
my claim to know where I live, I shall become aware of a feeling o f conviction as 
deeply-rooted as those attached to any of my political views. One may be inclined to 
say of cases in which one may have conviction on a particular point without being 
aware of it that one has the conviction without the feeling. Similarly (to anticipate) 
one may take pleasure in an activity without being aware o f it; in such circumstances 
one may be inclined to say that one is having pleasure, but not a feeling o f pleasure. 
(Cf. Gosling, 1969, pp. 47-53). But since I am distinguishing feelings from sensa­
tions in part by the claim that one can be unaware of one’s feelings, I will use ‘con­
viction’ and ‘feeling of conviction’ indifferently (and ‘pleasure’ and ‘feeling of 
pleasure’ as well).
9. See Millgram, forthcoming, for related discussion.
10. I am tempted to think that a partial explanation for the paradox o f hedonism 
(that is, the fact that many of the activities we engage in could not yield pleasure if  
their goal were understood to be pleasure) may be found here. Cf. Sidgwick, 
1907/1981, pp. 48ff.
11. Anscombe, 1985, p. 78.
12. If I am correct, this is not quite right: the judgment is not prior, rather, the 
pleasure just is the judgment.
13. Mill, 1863/1973, pp. 407, 440, 443, 472, Bentham, 1789/1973, p. 18.
14. Anscombe, 1985, p. 77.
15. On this point, see Gosling, 1969, pp. 28-53. .
16. For a fuller discussion, see Gosling, 1969, pp. 54-85. ‘ '
17. Cf. Nussbaum, 1986, pp. 89-121. .
18. This objection is due to Alyssa Bernstein.
19. More generally, it may be experiencing the desirable features of the cake that 
one is looking forward to; one need not think of oneself as a consumer o f sensations.
This distinction, incidentally, makes masochism conceptually unproblematic. 
Masochists are people who take pleasure in pain, and the existence of such people 
presents a problem for philosophers who hold pain to be the converse o f pleasure. 
(Athletes might be a less exotic case of people who can find painful sensations
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pleasurable.) But if the pain masochists allegedly take pleasure in is a sensation, then 
it is not the converse of pleasure, since pleasure is not, on my account, a sensation. 
What sensations are found pleasurable is not a matter of the logic of the notion of 
pleasure: while there may be good reasons for pain being not normally pleasurable, 
there is no reason in principle why sensations o f pain could not engender rock- 
bottom judgments o f desirability, that is, be pleasurable.
20. There is no general, nontrivial account of what makes observation, observa­
tion: the explanation o f what makes seeing that a chair is brown an observation will 
have precious little in common with the explanation of what makes seeing that a face 
looks like a Picasso an observation. So we should not expect a general, nontrivial ac­
count o f what makes a practical observation, a practical observation.
21. The objection is also in error in its claim that repeated pleasures always 
become less pleasurable: repeated wine tasting, or sexual experiences with a par­
ticular partner, or encounters with an exotic cuisine, may make those things much 
more pleasurable than they were found to be at first acquaintance.
Notice that although Nature has equipped us with rock-bottom dispositions to 
judge this or that desirable—say, to find food desirable after a moderately lenghty 
fast—pleasure depends in large part on one’s tastes. Now tastes, when educated, 
amount to taste (if not necessarily to good taste), and taste plays much the same role 
in our rock-bottom judgments o f desirability that certain kinds of background 
beliefs play in our acquiring rock-bottom convictions. For example, while I do not 
infer that I enjoy the painting from my knowledge o f its merits, the pleasure I take in 
it does depend on my having that knowledge. This is why taste can be both spon­
taneous and informed by belief, discrimination, and so on. Explaining how this can 
be the case is one o f the problems a theory of taste must address. (Cf. Schaper, 
1987.) That the present account o f pleasure provides means of addressing this dif­
ficulty suggests that it may be on the right track.
22. Desire-satisfaction theories must address this problem as well. Given that 
one’s desires typically are too much at cross-purposes to be thought of as a single, 
coherent goal, before embarking on instrumental reasoning proceeding toward the 
goal o f desire-satisfaction, a way must be found to rank, arrange and organize the 
desires that one proposes to try to satisfy.
23. This is not to say that the notion o f happiness plays no role in practical 
reasoning: o f course it does. I am inclined to think that its function is very like that 
of what Kant called regulative ideals. One must act on the assumption that it is possi­
ble to arrange one’s central (and, maybe, not-so-central) goals into a coherent and 
(in principle) satisfiable goal or life-plan: taken together, the things one (really) 
wants make up a picture of a life well-lived. This may not in fact be the case; having 
to act as though one’s ends allow this does not entail that they actually do. (Kant 
distinguished regulative ideals from the necessary preconditions of the possibility of 
experience.)
24. This advantage may be only apparent. We remarked on the diversity of  
pleasures above. If pleasures are so different from one another that they are not im­
mediately commensurable, organizing one’s pleasures into a single coherent goal is 
also a precondition of using pleasure as a starting point for instrumental reasoning.
25. Prominent advocates include Kolnai (1978), Richardson (1986; 1990), Wiggins 
(1980) and Broadie (1987).
26. For these examples, see E N  1095a 16-21, Williams, 1981, p. 104, Kolnai, 1978, 
pp. 44f.
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27. Kolnai, 1978, pp. 54, 58.
28. Broadie, 1987, pp. 238f. Her argument involves a problematic premise: that 
the more determinate cannot be inferentially extracted from the less. After all, if the 
determinateness o f one’s starting point is not stipulatively linked to the deter­
minateness of one’s conclusion, we may expect to find any number of counter­
examples in which determinateness increases as the inference is traversed. (Turning 
over several indistinct and obscure recollections of the previous day, I suddenly 
realize exactly what Sandra is up to.) I believe that the problematic premise may be 
defended; however, I will not further consider the issue here.
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